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Brazil is now one of the most decentralized federative countries in
the world, with the special feature that its decentralization is not the result
of an economic strategy, but of a political initiative of the 1988
Constitution. The distribution of income and expenditure between the
different spheres of government —central, state and municipal— shows
the considerable relative importance of the subnational levels of
government. Decentralization has not prevented extraordinary progress
in the structural reform of the Brazilian public finances in recent years.
The Fiscal Responsibility Law consolidated a process of change in fiscal
“culture”, reversing the tendency towards primary deficits and growing
indebtedness. The central government has formulated dynamic social
policies and shared programme execution with the subnational
governments, particularly in fundamental education, basic health
services and social assistance. What the Brazilian federation now needs
to do is not to reconstruct itself, but to improve itself still further, through
greater transparency in public actions and accounts and more
investments to modernize management.
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  This text is an updated version of a paper presented at the
Sixteenth Regional Seminar on Fiscal Policy, organized by the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
and the Latin American and Caribbean Institute of Economic and
Social Planning (ILPES) and held in Santiago, Chile, on 29 January
2004. The views expressed here are those of the author, and do not
necessarily represent those of the institutions with which he is
connected. Erika Amorim collaborated in the research and comments.
The author’s internet website is www.joserobertoafonso.ecn.br
1
 In this article, “intergovernmental” means the mutual relations
between the federal (central), intermediate (state) and local
(municipal) levels of government in the Federative Republic of
Brazil.
2
 For recent detailed analyses of Brazilian federalism, see Rezende
and Afonso (2002), Serra and Afonso (2002) and Rezende and
Oliveira (2003), among others. We also suggest consulting the
specialized website http://www.federativo.bndes.gov.br/.
This article analyses the nature of intergovernmental
financial relations1 within the Brazilian federation’s
advanced process of decentralization. The analysis
centers on the effects of these relations on fiscal and
macroeconomic policy management and the provision
of public goods and services in recent years.
The case of Brazil is particularly interesting
because it departs widely from the theoretical models
and experience of most countries, where decentralization
is generally a process planned and coordinated by the
central government, as Shah (2003) rightly notes, and
the financial transfers between the different levels of
government —central, state and municipal— are
normally for purposes related with general or sectoral
public policies. In Brazil, these transfers are designed
above all to ensure the fiscal and financial autonomy
of the subnational levels of government.
After the present introduction, the article refers
briefly to the special features of Brazilian federalism
(section II); describes the most salient features of the
system of intergovernmental financial relations (section
III); assesses the recent behaviour of the public deficit
and indebtedness from the point of view of economic
policy (section IV); likewise assesses the new role of
intergovernmental relations in the areas of education,
health and social protection in terms of the services
provided (section V); and in the conclusions (section
VI) it analyses options for improving the system and
advocates investment in the modernization of public
management, rather than trying to reduce the
constitutional allocations (vinculações) of given
percentages of the budgetary resources, in order to
improve the system’s performance.
3
 The formation of a transitional cabinet and the political and
administrative smoothness of the change of president were
internationally praised. The University of Notre Dame even




The federalism of Brazil is marked by conditioning
factors that must be taken into consideration from the
start when analysing its fiscal aspects.2  Wiesner (2003,
p. 76) sums this up by saying that, for various reasons,
the decentralization of Brazil is a special case, with
special normative and institutional characteristics.
This country, which is of continental dimensions
and has 177 million inhabitants, is a democratic
federation in every sense. Early in 2003, for the first
time in four decades, a directly elected civilian
president was succeeded by another who was not only
elected under the same conditions but was also his
bitterest opponent.3 Furthermore, in the largest states
of the federation, governors were elected who were
members of parties in opposition to that of the federal
government.
The most outstanding feature of the Brazilian
fiscal system is that its decentralization is not based on
political and economic policies formulated and
implemented under the orders of the federal government.
On the contrary, most of the intergovernmental
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relations cannot be established or modified by the
federal political and economic authorities according to
their own arbitrary wishes.
In Brazil, the main political option for
decentralization was adopted by the Constituent
Assembly which drafted and approved the Constitution
which has been in force since October 1988. This was
the basic framework for the process of re-democratization
after twenty years of military dictatorship. The idea
which prevailed in the Constituent Assembly was that
the reduction of the fiscal and financial power of the
central government and the corresponding strengthening
of that of the state and municipal governments
—especially in the less developed regions— should
form a kind of financial arm of a broader political
movement.
The “federative pact” is a principle which has
always been invoked but has never really been
formulated as such. It is based on the detailed text of
the Constitution regarding the tax system, in which
exclusive powers of taxation are assigned to each of
the three spheres of government: specifically, important
indirect taxes are assigned to the subnational levels of
government (a sales tax on goods for the states and a
tax on services in general for the municipalities). The
text of the constitution details a series of basic rules
for the collection of subnational taxes, which ensure
great autonomy for the levels of government in
question. It does the same with regard to the
constitutional distribution of taxes, even specifying the
percentages applicable, the limitations of the use of the
resources in question, and in some cases detailed
criteria for their apportionment.
The situation is not very different with regard to
the respective areas of competence in terms of
responsibilities and expenditures. Although the
Constitution also indicates some division of attributions
among levels of government, in practice there is
overlapping of activities, due above all to the great
differences between regions, not only in terms of
economic and social conditions but also the executive
capacity of the state and municipal public
administrations. At all events, it is important to note
that most of the subnational public expenditure does
not correspond to tasks delegated by upper spheres of
government. The lower spheres of government assume
such expenditures —even when there is no official act
or law formally giving them responsibility for such
outlays— in order to take care of the interests and
needs of the local community. In spite of the lack of
an institutional mechanism explicitly imposing such
responsibility, like that for tax income, public expenditure
was increasingly decentralized from the 1988 reform
onward.
Under the National Constitution, the states and
municipalities enjoy broad autonomy as regards
levying their taxes and collecting other forms of
income, making expenditures, and even hiring public
employees, defining their salaries, and contracting
debts. The budgets and corresponding rendering of
accounts are submitted to the legislative powers of the
subnational governments themselves and do not depend
on ex ante or ex post authorizations or evaluations by
the federal government. The so-called voluntary
transfers and possible loans obtained from federal
bodies are exceptions and therefore have little weight
in the present fiscal system. The subnational governments
also have a reasonable amount of leeway with regard
to larger federal transfers connected with fundamental
education and public health programmes,4 which
operate as what are called “general purpose subsidies”.
These initial observations aim to cover the main
institutional elements conditioning the Brazilian fiscal
system which must be taken into account when
analysing intergovernmental relations. Decentralization
is not the result of public policy options adopted by
the government, nor is it a mere fiscal strategy within
overall economic policy. Instead, it has a higher rank,
intimately linked with the permanent structure with
which the Brazilian federation has always been
endowed in the Constitution, since the federative form
of organization of the State was adopted in the very
first Constitution of the Republic, in the late 19th
century.
4
 In Brazil, since 1996 education has been organized in two levels:
i) basic education, which comprises pre-school education (0-6 years
of age), compulsory fundamental education (7-14 years of age), and
secondary education (15-17 years of age), and ii) higher education.
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III
An outline of the relations between the different
spheres of government
Among the federative countries of the world, Brazil
displays one of the most advanced levels of fiscal
decentralization, whatever the standard used. Strangely
enough, Brazilians do not see it in this way, especially
in political circles, where there are more and more
protests against the centralization of the fiscal system.5
This perception may reflect the changes in the general
thrust of the federal distribution of tax revenue defined
by the 1988 Constituent Assembly but little publicized
and discussed in the country as yet.6
The division of the main fiscal flows and stocks
among the different levels of government —central,
state and municipal— highlights the considerable
relative importance of the subnational levels.
The states and municipalities directly collect 31%
of the high global tax burden, which was estimated to
amount to 35.5% of the gross domestic product (GDP)
in 2003 (table 1). After the transfers provided for by
the Constitution, this relative proportion rises to 41%.
According to the national accounts, this amount is
almost equal to the proportion of total fiscal expenditure
(41.1% of GDP in 2002) corresponding to the subnational
levels of government. In the case of the distribution of
expenditure, the aggregate result conceals great
differences by category: the federal government is
responsible for 80% or more of expenditure for social
benefits (14.7% of GDP) and interest on the debt (nearly
10% of GDP in 2003), while the state and municipal
levels are responsible for 70% of the payroll for active
public employees (10.1% of GDP) and 82% of gross fixed
capital formation (2.2% of GDP).
According to the official methodology for
analysing the net public sector debt and its financial
5
 This was also the main theme of the electoral campaign of the
present President, who laid stress on his promise to review the
federative pact —in order to increase the income of the subnational
governments— as the feature differentiating his tax reform project
from others.
6
 These changes became clearer in the two-year period 2003-2004:
the statistical evidence indicates a growing federal share of direct
tax revenue and available income. The data for 2004 given in this
article were taken from budgets which were adopted months before
the beginning of the financial year, so that the actual results may
naturally be considerably different.
needs (which, unlike the previous data, include state
enterprises), a little over a quarter of the primary
surplus (4.3% of GDP in 2003), 30% of the expenditure,
including interest, and almost 40% of the net public
sector debt (58.2% of GDP in December 2003)
corresponded to the sub-national levels of government.
The national accounts make it possible to prepare
a complete updated picture of the intergovernmental
flows registered in the public administration accounts.
The latest data released by the IBGE refer to the financial
year 2002. They cover the constitutional distribution
of revenue and the other transfers allocated in the same
way in those accounts. They include both regular
transfers and those made in connection with the Fund
for the Maintenance and Development of Fundamental
Education and the Upgrading of Teachers (FUNDEF), the
Unified Health System (sus) and also the federal
commitments in respect of support for the government
of the Federal District and the former Emancipated
Territories (now the states of Amapá and Roraima).
They also include the so-called voluntary transfers,
authorized only for special purposes but always
included in the budget of the transferring government.7
The total flow of resources among the three
spheres of government is considerable, amounting in
2002 to 7.8% of GDP (table 2). This is equivalent to a
little over one-fifth of total national tax income and,
when other items are also taken into account, to almost
18% of the current income of the governments and 16%
of total fiscal expenditure. As a general rule, the transfers
are from the upper spheres to the lower ones. The
balance between the amount granted and the amount
received is positive, even in the case of the states: 1.1%
of GDP, equivalent to 10% of their own budgets.8
7
 The annual balance sheets of the various units of the three spheres
of government referred to throughout this article are prepared by
the National Treasury Ministry (STN) and are consolidated under
the title Finanças do Brasil. They are available on the Internet
website of that ministry (http://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/
estados_municipios/index.asp).
8
 Exceptionally, with the creation of FUNDEF horizontal transfers
increased, even involving a redistribution of resources between state
and municipal governments, as described below.
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TABLE 1
Brazil: General aspects of the Brazilian federation,
by the three spheres of governmenta
Tax resourcesb Public expenditureb Financial needs and net indebtedness
Spheres of government Units Direct Available Activel Social Fixed Total (including Primary Interest Net
collection income staff benefits capital formation surplus interest) surplus (responsibilities debt
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Central Unión 1 68.8 59.0 30.0 85.0 17.6 57.8 73.1 70.7 61.2
Intermediate States 26+1 26.6 24.9 43.2 12.9 41.4 25.5 23.7 25.0 34.3
Local Municipalities 5 532+27 4.6 16.1 26.8 2.1 41.0 16.6 3.2 4.3 4.6
Total 5 586 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
As % of GDP 35.5 35.5 10.12 14.67 2.20 41.08 –4.3 9.5 58.2
Year 2003 2003 2002 2002 2002 2002 2003 2003 2003
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE), the Central Bank of
Brazil and the Ministry of Finance.
a Political organization: state sphere (26 states plus the Federal District); local sphere (5,560 municipalities officially established and receiving
federal transfers, 26 capitals, 5,532 municipalities in the interior), and the Federal District.
b The tax resources and public expenditure include social security (with extra-budgetary funds such as the Unemployment Insurance Fund-
FGTS) but exclude business activities.
c Financial needs and net debt: measured above the line (IMF methodology). Include the Central Bank in the case of the Union and state
enterprises in each sphere of government (unlike other items).
TABLE 2
Brazil: Structure of intergovernmental financial relations, 2002a
Intergovernmental Amount As % of expenditure As % of income
flowsb Billions % of % of total Gross Own expenditure Gross Own expenditure Tax income
of reales GDP (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Expenditurec 104 936 7.80 100.0 16.0 19.0 14.9 17.7 22.3
Union 73 570 5.47 70.1 18.7 23.0 17.1 17.1 22.3
States 30 784 2.29 29.3 17.9 21.8 17.0 23.1 25.9
Municipalities 582 0.04 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 2.0 2.9
Incomed 104 936 7.80 100.0 16.0 19.0 14.9 17.7 22.3
Union 103 0.01 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
States 45 026 3.35 42.9 26.2 31.9 24.9 33.8 37.9
Municipalities 59 807 4.44 57.0 64.6 65.0 64.4 201.1 294.2
Balance (0) 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Union (73 467) –5.46 –70.0 –18.7 –23.0 –17.1 –17.1 –22.2
States 14 242 1.06 13.6 8.3 10.1 7.9 10.7 12.0
Municipalities 59 225 4.40 56.4 64.0 64.4 63.8 199.2 291.3
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from IBGE (2003, table 39).
a Transfers do not only include those corresponding to the constitutional distribution of tax income, but also other regular transfers (from
FUNDEF and SUS) and voluntary transfers.
b The intergovernmental flows correspond to the difference between gross or own income and expenditure.
c Expenditure includes intermediate consumption, payment of employees, subsidies, social benefits, interest and gross fixed capital formation.
d Income includes taxes, property rents and sundry income.
On the side of the transferring governments, there
is a concentration of 70% of the flows in the Union,
which transferred an amount equal to 5.5% of GDP in
2002 and consumed one-fifth of its global fiscal
expenditure, equivalent to 22% of its tax revenue or
17% of all that it collected. Although the states account
for the remaining 30% of transfers, these too weight
quite heavily in their budgets, since they represent
about a fifth of their expenditures, or a quarter if only
direct tax revenue is considered.
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On the side of the recipient governments, in 2002
the municipalities benefited more than the states (4.4%
versus 3.3% of GDP): the transfers they received were
three times the size of their direct tax revenue and
double their own income, so that 65% of the
municipalities’ expenditure was financed with the
money transferred. The states, for their part, received
transfers equivalent to one-third of their own income,
covering a quarter of their expenditure.
It may be noted that this diagnosis of the sub-
national governments as a whole involves significant
variations between the different government units,
mainly because of the profound economic and fiscal
inequalities. The extent to which each unit depends on
transfers —especially from the funds for sharing in the
income from federal taxes— is directly related with its
level of development. Consequently, when the
evolution of their own income is very different from
that of resources transferred from other levels, the
characteristics of the sub-national finances are also very
different.
After this more global diagnosis of intergovernmental
financial relations, we will concentrate our analysis on
the tax system, since the constitutional distribution of
income (6.3% of GDP in 2002) accounts for 80% of the
total transfers between levels of government.
Although a deeper reform of areas of competence
in terms of taxes has not been made, the global tax
burden has increased considerably, and continues to do
so, after the serious external crisis suffered by the
country at the end of the 1990s. In order to cope with
this crisis, an austere fiscal stability programme was
adopted, based on a sharp rise in federal taxes. Between
1998 and 2003 the global tax burden increased from
29.6% to 35.5% of GDP.
This increase coincided with a renewed
centralization of direct tax revenue, although this was
partially offset by intergovernmental transfers. Before
the radical decentralization provided for in the 1988
Constitution, the Union directly collected 70% of
national taxes (22.4% of GDP). In 1991, this proportion
went down to 63%, but after the creation of the Real,
the introduction and/or increase in social contributions
allowed it to rise to 69% in 2002-2003.
There was also a slight change in the trends in
available tax income, which includes the revenue
collected by the spheres of government themselves plus
(or less) the income from the constitutional distribution
of tax income among the different spheres.
From a historical perspective, the states have lost
much relative importance. In 1960 they received 34%
of national tax income, but as they were the spheres
most affected by the centralization of the military
government, this proportion went down to 22% by
1980 (table 3). Eight years later, when the last major
constitutional reform was approved, the greater
political openness enabled them to recover five
percentage points. Their share even rose to 29% in
1991, but from that time on it went down steadily, so
that in 2003 it is estimated that the states received only
a quarter of national tax income, which is less than in
1988. It should be noted that the loss was only in terms
of their percentage of tax resources received, since in
absolute terms the volume of tax income received by
the states grew faster than GDP (as did the tax burden).
It should also be noted that the fiscal war over the sales
tax on goods and services (ICMS) is one of the reasons
why the performance of this tax was inferior to that of
the expansion in indirect federal taxes.
The municipalities, in contrast, were the main
beneficiaries of the tax reform, increasing their
proportion of national taxes received from 11% to 17%
in the first ten years of operation of the new system
(to such a point that some persons asked whether, in
practice, the reform was not giving rise to a federation
of municipalities).9 As from the external crisis of the
late 1990s, however, the federal advance brought with
it marginal losses for the municipalities, which were
receiving 16% of national tax income at the end of
2003 (table 4).
The only reason why the situation of the local
levels of government did not deteriorate in recent years
was that they obtained an increasing share of state tax
income through the redistribution effected by FUNDEF.
Account should also be taken of the increasingly large
transfers by the SUS, which, as they are not of a structural
nature, are not included in table 4. Nevertheless, there
are discrepancies according to the category of
municipalities, due to the big differences in the financing
model. Note in particular, for example, the recent
reduction in the Municipal Participation Fund (FPM),
which affects above all the smaller municipalities and
those located in the poorest areas of the interior.10 In
9
 This was the main subject that Afonso and de Mello (2002) had
to address at a conference of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
on comparative federative experiences.
10
 When the local balance sheets for 2002 are grouped in categories
according to the number of inhabitants, it is seen that the FPM
accounts for almost 60% of the available tax income or half of the
current income of the municipalities with fewer than 5,000
inhabitants. As the population grows, this dependency goes down,
but even in the case of cities with 50,000 to 100,000 inhabitants the
FPM alone represents a quarter of the available tax income and one-
fifth of current income.
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TABLE 3
Brazil: Evolution of tax income by spheres of government,
selected years between 1960 and 2004a
Tax burden (% of GDP) Composition (% of total)
Federal State Local Total Federal State Local Total
Direct collection
1960 11.10 5.50 0.80 17.40 64.0 31.3 4.8 100.0
1980 18.50 5.40 0.70 24.60 75.1 22.0 2.9 100.0
1988 15.79 5.94 0.65 22.40 70.5 26.5 2.9 100.0
2002b 24.39 9.47 1.68 35.54 68.6 26.7 4.7 100.0
2003b 24.42 9.45 1.63 35.49 68.8 26.6 4.6 100.0
2004c 24.99 9.46 1.74 36.18 69.1 26.1 4.8 100.0
Available income
1960 10.40 5.90 1.10 17.40 59.4 34.0 6.6 100.0
1980 17.00 5.50 2.10 24.60 69.2 22.2 8.6 100.0
1988 14.00 6.00 2.40 22.40 62.3 26.9 10.8 100.0
2002b 20.56 9.06 5.92 35.54 57.9 25.5 16.7 100.0
2003b 20.94 8.83 5.73 35.49 59.0 24.9 16.1 100.0
2004c 21.42 8.90 5.87 36.18 59.2 24.6 16.2 100.0
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV)/IBGE, national accounts, the National Treasury
Ministry (STN), the Federal Inland Revenue Secretariat, IBGE, the Ministry of Social Security and Assistance, the Federal Economic Fund,
the National Council on Finance Policy, and Finanças do Brasil (STN, various years).
a The methodology used is that of the national accounts, which includes taxes, charges and rates —such as the Provisional Contribution on
Financial Movements (CPMF) and the Unemployment Insurance Fund (FGTS)— as well as the active debt and interest. Direct collection
corresponds to tax collection by the relevant levels of government themselves. Available income corresponds to the amount collected, plus
(or less) that corresponding to the constitutional distribution of tax income.
b Preliminary estimates.
c Budget of the Union.
2003, the FPM was reduced by 16% compared with the
previous year and stood at less than 20 billion reales
—the smallest amount transferred in a year since
1995.11
The Union, which had suffered the serious initial
effects of the introduction of the present tax system
—its share in national tax revenue went down from
62% in 1998 to less than 55% in 1991 (its worst
year)— recovered considerably (to 59%) in 1994, the
year in which the real was created. Subsequently its
share began to go down again, sinking to 56% in 1998.
From then on, two movements with the same origin
increased the national tax burden and also the
proportion corresponding to the Union, whose share in
2003 came to 59%, only three points below the level
registered in 1988, before the last major amendment
to the Constitution, thus mitigating somewhat the trend
towards decentralization in the distribution of tax
revenue (table 5); it should not be forgotten that the
marked increase in the total tax mass greatly benefited
the subnational levels of government.
The tax policy of the present federal government
gives an unprecedented degree of priority to the
collection of social contributions which are not shared
with other spheres of government. This acts to the
detriment of the relative and absolute importance —at
constant values— of the revenue from income tax and,
above all, from the taxes on manufactured products,
which are distributed through the participation funds.
If we compare the revenue from income tax and
the tax on manufactured products, which form the
basis of the FPE and the FPM, with the revenue from
the four main social contributions —the Contribution
for the Financing of Social Security (COFINS), the
Social Integration Programme (PIS), the Social
Contribution on Net Profits (CSLL) and the Provisional
Contribution on Financial Movements (CPMF)— we
11
 The contraction in the FPM caused serious financial problems in
the small municipalities of the interior. Over 2,000 of them were
unable to pay the “thirteenth month” bonus to their employees in
December 2003. This contraction speeded up the deterioration in
local finances already observed in the balance sheets for the previous
year. 44% of the municipalities (2,423) ended 2002 with fiscal
deficits, according to the Brazilian Institute of Municipal
Administration (IBAM, 2003), the highest proportion being observed
in the case of cities in the North and Northeast.
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TABLE 4
Brazil: Annual distribution of available tax income,
by spheres of government, 1988-2004a
Years As % of GDP As % of total
Federal State Municipal Total Federal State Municipal Total
1988 13.96 6.03 2.42 22.40 62.3 26.9 10.8 100.0
1989 14.73 6.03 3.36 24.13 61.1 25.0 13.9 100.0
1990 16.95 7.94 3.89 28.78 58.9 27.6 13.5 100.0
1991 13.78 7.47 3.96 25.21 54.7 29.6 15.7 100.0
1992 14.23 7.03 3.73 24.98 57.0 28.1 14.9 100.0
1993 14.90 6.81 4.07 25.78 57.8 26.4 15.8 100.0
1994 17.65 7.47 4.64 29.75 59.3 25.1 15.6 100.0
1995 16.52 8.00 4.88 29.41 56.2 27.2 16.6 100.0
1996 16.30 8.04 4.75 29.09 56.0 27.6 16.3 100.0
1997 16.62 8.18 4.76 29.56 56.2 27.7 16.1 100.0
1998 16.66 7.89 5.09 29.64 56.2 26.6 17.2 100.0
1999 18.08 8.25 5.39 31.71 57.0 26.0 17.0 100.0
2000 18.53 8.63 5.52 32.67 56.7 26.4 16.9 100.0
2001 19.58 8.86 5.70 34.14 57.4 25.9 16.7 100.0
2002b 20.56 9.06 5.92 35.54 57.9 25.5 16.7 100.0
2003b 20.94 8.83 5.73 35.49 59.0 24.9 16.1 100.0
2004c 21.42 8.90 5.87 36.18 59.2 24.6 16.2 100.0
Variation 2003/1998
as % of GDP 6.98 2.80 3.31 13.09 53.3 21.4 25.3 100.0
Relative variation 50.0% 46.5% 136.8% 58.4%
Variation 2004/1998
as % of GDP 7.46 2.87 3.45 13.78 54.1 20.8 25.0 100.0
Relative variation 53.5% 47.7% 142.5% 61.5%
Source: As in table 3.
a The methodology used is that of the national accounts, which includes taxes, charges and rates —such as the Provisional Contribution on
Financial Movements (CPMF) and the Unemployment Insurance Fund (FGTS)— as well as the active debt and interest. Available income
corresponds to the amount collected, plus (or less) that corresponding to the constitutional distribution of tax income.
b Preliminary estimates.
c Budget of the Union.
TABLE 5
Brazil: Increase and division of the global tax burden in the
period after the Constituent Assembly, 1988-2004a
Increase in burden How much of the increase went to each sphere of government?
As % Per phase As % of GDP As %
of GDP (% total) Union States Municipalities Union States Municipalities
After the Constituent 1988-2003 13.09 100 6.98 2.80 3.31 53 21 25
Assembly
Before the Plano Real 1988-1993 3.38 26 0.95 0.78 1.65 28 23 49
Immediately after the 1993-1998 3.86 29 1.76 1.08 1.02 46 28 26
 Plano Real
After the exchange 1998-2003 5.85 45 4.27 0.94 0.64 73 16 11
 rate crisis
Administration of Pres. 2004-2002 0.65 100 0.85 –0.16 –0.05 132 –24 –8
da Silva (two years)
After the Constituent 1988-2004 13.78 100 7.46 2.87 3.45 54 21 25
 Assembly
Source: As in table 3.
a The methodology used is that of the national accounts, which includes taxes, charges and rates —such as the Provisional Contribution on
Financial Movements (CPMF) and the Unemployment Insurance Fund (FGTS)— as well as the active debt and interest. Available income
corresponds to the amount collected, plus (or less) that corresponding to the constitutional distribution of tax income. For 2002-2003
preliminary estimates were used, and for 2004, budget projections.
Period
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see that the aggregate amounts were practically the
same in 1994 and 2002. In those eight years, there
was a difference of only five percentage points, which
was due to the fact that the income from contributions
grew faster than that from taxes. There was a rapid
change in 2003, however, when the income from
those contributions exceeded to income from taxes by
13 percentage points. In the 2004 budget, the
difference is expected to rise to 27%: a 25% increase
in only two years.12
Whereas initially decentralization led to the
municipalization of public resources, the recent
advance by the federal government in its share of
national tax resources (while not forgetting that the
global tax burden also increased) means that the
relative importance of the state governments in this
respect went down, reflecting the tendency to centralize
direct tax collection and, to a lesser extent, the income
available as from the 2003-2004 period.13 Consequently,
if it is considered that the federation is going through
a crisis, then this would be a structural crisis at the
intermediate levels of government (and, at this time of
smaller transfers from the participation funds, a crisis
in the situation of the subnational levels of government,
especially in the case of small municipalities, which
depend to a large extent on those transfers).
12
 The joint revenue from income tax and the tax on manufactured
products increased by almost 42 billion reales between 1994 and
2002, compared with the increase of around 46 billion reales in the
main social contributions (COFINS, PIS, CSLL and CPMF). This means
that the base for the participation funds contracted in relative terms.
The situation has changed a great deal between 2002 and 2004,
however. According to the federal government’s own budget,
revenue from the two taxes in question will go down by almost 10
billion reales (-0.75% of GDP), while the income from contributions
will increase by some 18 billion reales (+0.86% of GDP). Thus the
ratio between the two aggregates will rise from 97% in 1994 and
102% in 2002 to 113% in 2003 and 127% in 2004. This is the main
evidence of the relative weakening of the base of the participation
funds.
13
 Late in December 2003, a constitutional amendment was approved
which was supposed to promote reform of the tax system on the
basis of the draft submitted by the new government at the end of
April. The proposed modifications are far from reformulating the
system, however. The amendment basically addresses the most
pressing needs to maintain the fiscal adjustment by extending until
2007 the collection of the Provisional Contribution on Financial
Movements (CPMF) and the mechanism for the budgetary delinking
of the Union (the so-called DRU), which represents 20% of the freely
usable contributions. The reform did not affect any form of tax
collection powers and changed intergovernmental relations only very
slightly. It introduced the distribution of a quarter of the economic
contribution on fuels in order to finance investments in transport
(Contribution for Intervention in the Economic Field-CIDE).
IV
The new fiscal culture
The greater or lesser decentralization of the fiscal
system has not been an obstacle to the achievement of
notable progress in the structural reform of the
Brazilian public finances in recent years. Monetary
stability was attained with the 1994 Plano Real and was
consolidated in spite of the decentralized federation.
The same thing occurred in the case of fiscal stability,
which was achieved through a new economic policy,
applied in the late 1990s, which was based on a system
of inflation targets, a fluctuating exchange rate, and
responsible fiscal management.
The existence of a system of intergovernmental
relations which mobilizes a considerable flow of
resources for the purpose of vertical and horizontal
decentralization of the tax system did not prevent the
above-mentioned economic policy from being
formulated and implemented, even taking into account
the demands for the faithful fulfillment of the fiscal
targets, increased primary surpluses even in the case
of the subnational levels of government, and the
restrictions on the respective levels of net indebtedness.
Nor did it affect the changes in strategy as regards tax
policy —including the increase in the global tax burden
already referred to— or the policies regarding
expenditure (greater austerity in terms of the payroll,
the social security of public employees, and
investments) or the improvement and decentralization
of social policies. The latter include both universal
policies (education and health) and the new
programmes of targeted assistance, for whose
application close collaboration between different
spheres of government was of fundamental importance.
Behind this turnaround in the fiscal, economic and
social spheres, there was a process of restructuring of
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the State which culminated in the approval of the Fiscal
Responsibility Law —applicable to all three spheres
of government— in mid-2000. Rather than initiating
modifications, this Law consolidated the existing
changes. Made in Brazil is a legal device almost
without parallel in other countries. Much more
important than the Law itself was the change in
mentality it provoked, which made it possible to create
greater awareness of the need for macroeconomic
stability, on which there is now a practically complete
national consensus.
Generating primary surpluses and keeping the
public debt under control are the most important
aspects of the fiscal policy of a country obliged to
apply a rapid and vigorous fiscal adjustment in order
to meet its debt obligations and weather a succession
of external crises. These crises occurred throughout the
second half of the 1990s and, more recently, in the
second half of 2003, because of the expectation over
the Presidential elections.
In short, up to the mid-1990s the country suffered
a process of uncontrolled indebtedness of the states and
municipalities, sometimes induced by the economic
policy itself, and in some cases even without proper
recording of the debts. After the creation of the Real,
the federal government embarked on a new and
definitive process of renegotiation and assumption of all
debts by the National Treasury –even those with banks
and those in respect of movable property. In return,
among other things, a fiscal adjustment programme was
signed with each state and municipality, which included
performance goals and the prohibition of new
indebtedness until the total debt was reduced to a
national maximum level. The programme also provided
for the payment to creditors of a monthly debt service
quota as a fixed proportion of current income and
—as the main condition— the provision of solid
guarantees (blocking and automatic withholding of
constitutional transfers and own income).
One day after the process of signing the series of
debt refinancing programmes was completed, the
Fiscal Responsibility Law was published, prohibiting
the granting of new credits by the Union and the
signing of new agreements regarding what had already
been renegotiated (with the sole exception of
guarantees for foreign loans, provided there was
sufficient and suitable collateral). In the view of some,
this provision alone was sufficient to ensure the success
of the Law. Indeed, once the umbilical cord between
the federal government and the subnational
governments had been cut, this made it possible to
combine autonomy and responsibility for the first time
in the history of the Brazilian Federation. It may be
noted that it is no easy matter to amend this Law, which
is a complementary law, because this would require the
assent of an absolute majority of each chamber of the
Congress.
As from 2000, there was a considerable ongoing
flow of payments in respect of the renegotiated debt.
There were very few cases in which some state or
municipal government failed to pay the monthly
installment on the debt. In any case, this would result
in the blocking of that government’s resources by the
Treasury. Since the access of the larger subnational
governments to the credit market was practically
eliminated and the service payments of the renegotiated
debt were regularized, the states began to generate
substantial and growing primary surpluses.
After the serious external crisis of the late 1990s,
the country signed a series of agreements with the IMF.
The target for the primary surplus began with 3.1% of
GDP in 1999, rising to 3.75% of GDP at the beginning
of 2002. After the crisis of confidence caused by the
Presidential campaign, this percentage went up to 3.8%
and later 4.25% of GDPL: a target which the new federal
government extended until 2006. The country
systematically managed to comply with these
requirements, but the situation evolved differently in
the case of the net debt, because of the continuation
of the process of recognition of liabilities (the so-called
“skeletons”) and because of the effects of the rise in
real interest rates and currency devaluation. Thus, the
first target for the net debt was its reduction from 53%
of GDP —after the spectacular devaluation of the
currency— to 46.5% at the end of 2001.
In the adjustment of financing needs, in
accordance with the methodology defined by the IMF,
1998 was the last year in which the subnational
governments registered primary deficits, although the
GDP went down by 0.2% because of the poor results of
the states. The following year, there was a primary
surplus of +0.2%, which continued to grow in
subsequent years until it reached 0.9% of GDP in 2003
(exceptionally, in the period from January to
November). The results surpassed the goal which had
been set: at the end of 2003 the net debt was 913 billion
reales, which was well below the limit of 955 billion
agreed with the IMF.
On the other hand, the drastic increase in 2003 in
interest rates on the public debt (9.5% of GDP) ate up
the whole of the increase in the primary surplus and
gave rise to the biggest nominal deficit in the decade
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(5.2% of GDP), seriously prejudicing the National
Treasury (table 6).
The state and municipal components of the net
debt (table 7) evolved less favourably at the turn of the
decade, not because of the generation of a deficit or
the past placement of paper at excessive spreads, but
because of the recognition of old debts which had not
been properly recorded and, above all, because the
element used for indexing the refinancing contracts
with the Treasury —the general price index-internal
supply (IGP-DI) calculated by the Getulio Vargas
Foundation— was much higher than the consumer
price indexes, mainly because it is more sensitive to
exchange rate devaluation.
Thus, the net debt of the subnational governments
increased from 14.1% to 18.3% of GDP between 1998
and 2001, after the conclusion of the refinancing
process with the Treasury. In 2003 this proportion rose
to 19.3% of GDP, but the increase was not due to
primary deficits but to the correction of debts
renegotiated with the Treasury (table 7), for which an
over-inflated index (the general price index) was used
in periods of currency devaluation. This does not affect
the amount paid by the subnational governments,
which is calculated as a proportion of their income, but
it can lead to an increase in the amount that must be
refinanced at the end of the period originally
contracted.
TABLE 6
Brazil: Public sector finance needsa
(As a percentage of GDP)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Nominal finance needs 7.46 5.78 3.61 3.58 4.59 5.16
Central government 4.93 2.70 2.27 2.11 0.75 4.06
States 1.80 2.68 1.81 1.93 3.25 1.50
Municipalities 0.22 0.47 0.27 0.10 0.58 0.27
State enterprises 0.51 –0.07 –0.74 –0.56 0.01 –0.66
Nominal interest  7.47  8.97  7.08  7.21  8.48  9.49
Central government 5.48 5.03 4.13 3.94 3.12 6.59
States 1.39 2.84 2.23 2.53 3.89 2.28
Municipalities 0.44 0.52 0.40 0.37 0.73 0.39
State enterprises 0.16 0.58 0.32 0.37 0.74 0.23
Primary result –0.01 –3.19 –3.47 –3.63 –3.89 –4.32
Central government –0.55 –2.33 –1.86 –1.83 –2.37 –2.53
States 0.41 –0.16 –0.42 –0.60 –0.64 –0.78
Municipalities –0.22 –0.05 –0.13 –0.27 –0.15 –0.12
State enterprises 0.35 –0.65 –1.06 –0.93 –0.73 –0.89
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Brazil (time series).
a Positive figures indicate a deficit and negative figures a surplus.
TABLE 7
Brazil: Net public sector debt, 1998-2003a
(As a percentage of GDP)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total 41.71 48.68 48.77 52.63 55.49 58.53
Central government 25.00 29.80 30.57 32.79 35.32 37.23
States 12.23 13.94 13.96 16.20 16.25 17.71
Municipalities 1.92 2.15 2.09 2.08 2.20 2.47
State enterprises 2.56 2.79 2.15 1.56 1.72 1.13
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Brazil (time series).
a Includes both internal and external debt.
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It is interesting to observe the differences in
behaviour between the states, which are much more
heavily indebted and are also obliged to achieve larger
primary surpluses, and the municipalities. Although the
budget of the former is not even twice that of the latter,
the primary surplus demanded from the states (0.9%
of GDP up to November 2003) is almost seven times
larger than that generated by the municipalities (0.1%
of GDP). The same proportion is observed in the case
of indebtedness: 17.4% of GDP for the states, compared
with only 2.4% of GDP for the municipalities.
The concentration of state and municipal debt in
the federal government (almost 95% of the total) is
another striking feature: at the end of 2003 the total
amount of debt renegotiated by the National Treasury
came to 16.5% of GDP (263.5 billion reales), 91% of
which corresponded to the state governments.
Once again, the differences between the different
units of government are very evident, since some are
much more heavily indebted than others (over half the
municipalities of Brazil have not contracted any bank
debts at all, for example). Consequently, the improvement
in the fiscal results is a generalized phenomenon,
whatever the size of the federated entities or the region
they belong to.
In short, decentralization has not prevented the
formulation and implementation of a far-reaching
policy of fiscal austerity.14 The heavy intergovernmental
transfers, which formed both the basis for the
calculation of the debt service quotas and a guarantee
for the retention and transfer of net values, helped
directly and decisively to make the subnational
governments take part in the national fiscal
programme. The transfers make it possible to increase
the size of the quotas to be paid and to ensure the
payment of the subnational debts renegotiated with the
Treasury, which represent almost the whole of the total
amount owed by the states and municipalities.
In spite of their significant and growing loss of
participation in the distribution of national tax
revenue, in 2003 the states generated a primary
surplus equivalent to 9% of their available tax
income: not much less than the 12% achieved by the
federal government, which has a bigger and more
diversified income base. In the case of the
municipalities, the surplus corresponded to only 2%
of that income. The states are making a big sacrifice
in order to pay —and pay dearly— for the sins of
previous administrations marked by budgetary and
financial imbalance.15
14
 Araújo (2003, pp. 74-75) found that the fiscal adjustment of the
state governments in the late 1990s was based largely on cuts in
expenditure.
15
 The same conclusion was reached by authors such as Guardia
and Sonder (2004).
V
Dynamic social policies and associations
between different spheres of government
The intergovernmental relations most strongly
developed in Brazil since the mid-1990s were those
related with the fields of finance and association for
the provision of services, against the background of
the greater efforts reflected in the adoption of dynamic
and creative social policies. The two most
representative cases were the reform of the financing
of fundamental public education and subsequently of
the health system, which involved the assumption of
the obligation to assign those areas certain percentages
of the available resources, the modification of the
apportionment criteria for the main transfers of tax
revenue, and an increase in the contributions made by
the federal government, in order to induce greater and
more effective participation by the states and
municipalities.
 It should be noted that such relations are not
always of a financial nature, since they do not
necessarily involve movements of resources between
the different levels of government. This is so, for
example, in the case of the new social protection and
assistance programmes. Generally speaking, their
financing is federal (sometimes complemented with
finance or parallel programmes in some states and
municipalities), but the subnational governments play
an important role in the implementation of the services
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provided or their follow-up and evaluation (for
example, they make a census of the population
benefited and check up that families are complying
with their obligations).
1. Fundamental education: redistribution of state
resources
The most important change in intergovernmental
financial relations was the establishment of a
constitutional obligation to allocate resources for the
maintenance and development of education. In
September 1996 a constitutional amendment created
FUNDEF in order to modify the system for the financing
of fundamental education.16
In practice, a transitory decision was taken that
for ten years every unit of the federation should allocate
to FUNDEF 60% of the quarter of state and municipal
tax income that the Constitution obliged those units to
spend on education. It is a kind of reservation of
resources (a specific allocation from within the larger
allocation) resulting from 15% of the federal transfers
of the participation funds17 corresponding to each state,
plus 15% of the respective states’ own revenue from
the sales tax on goods and services (ICMS), for
subsequent allocation to the FUNDEF of each state (in
reality there is not just one FUNDEF but 27). While 85%
of the participation funds is distributed among the
subnational governments according to normal
apportionment criteria and 85% of ICMS is divided
between the state (three quarters) and its municipalities
(the remaining quarter, according to a predetermined
formula), the funds collected by the FUNDEF of each
state are divided between the state government and
those of the municipalities according to the number of
students enrolled in the fundamental educational
establishments maintained by each federated unit.
As well as redistributing resources among the
subnational governments, the Union also undertook to
provide a compensatory supplement when a state’s
own funds were not sufficient to attain a minimum
level of expenditure per student per year. The aim of
this federal subsidy was to make it easier to secure the
approval and support of the subnational governments
for the proposal, but it subsequently became irrelevant
to the functioning of FUNDEF. Ever since it came into
operation in 1998, the base level for the subsidy was
set below the national average, and subsequently it was
adjusted less than the nominal growth of the tax income
feeding the Fund; thus, the coverage of the
compensatory supplement was considerably reduced
(eight states were benefited in the first year, but only
four in 2003) and the financial outlays went down (the
corresponding expenditure went down even in nominal
terms during the period in question, falling from around
500 million reales to some 300 million).
Thus, FUNDEF represents an innovative instrument
which is still unique in the Brazilian fiscal system,
because it involves a far-reaching periodic (annual)
redistribution of resources either vertically (from the
states to the municipalities) or horizontally (between
municipalities). The size of the school system of each
unit of government has become the only (and decisive)
criterion for defining this new form of intergovernmental
financial relations in the country, and it consequently
directly influences the increase in the provision of
services. Unfortunately, it has also led to the
commission of some statistical frauds. Although only
a few isolated cases have been denounced, this has led
to the strengthening of controls and joint measures
—sometimes even of a penal nature— by the Ministry
of Education, the Public Accounts Tribunals and the
Ministry of Justice.18
Since the financial health of the municipalities is
generally better than that of the states, the same process
has been accompanied both by the decentralization of
the corresponding resources and expenditures and by
much more rational resource distribution criteria than
those applied to the FPM (which were based on
population brackets with excessively high minimum
and excessively low maximum values).
Although the federal government finally took on
a dominant role in the planning, formulation,
coordination and evaluation of the new policy on the
financing of education, this did not change in any way
the responsibilities of the states and municipalities with
regard to the provision of services. Decentralization
took place by voluntary adhesion, as a natural process
in which the local spheres took over the role previously
played by the state. Municipalization was not imposed
by the constitutional amendment which set up FUNDEF,
16
 Constitutional Amendment No. 14 of 12 September 1996.
17
 The FPE, the FPM, the Compensation Fund on exports of
manufactured goods (FPEX), and the Kandir Law.
18
 In this respect, the Ministry of Education works with the state
prosecutors to detect possible irregularities and take measures against
those responsible; since 2003 it has published on the Internet a text
entitled “Subsidies to the Ministry of Justice for the Monitoring of
FUNDEF” (http://www.mec.gov.br/sef/fundef/pdf/fundef.pdf).
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and much less by the federal government, but was
induced by the changes in intergovernmental financial
relations.
The constitutional allocation of resources to
FUNDEF has considerable weight in the overall Brazilian
fiscal picture: in 2003 it mobilized 25.2 billion reales,
equivalent to 1.6% of GDP and over 11% of available
subnational tax income. The vertical redistribution was
very significant, since the municipalities received 51%
of the total amount mobilized (the difference was
greater in the case of the distribution of income from
the sales tax on goods and services, 75% of which went
to the states and only 25% to the municipalities).
In financial terms, this means that without FUNDEF
the tax income available to the states would be 4.8
billion reales higher (0.3% of gdp). This was the
amount (5.5% of their original income) which the states
lost to the municipal governments in a single year,
2003. In that year, 26 state governments redistributed
income to their municipalities through FUNDEF.19
These figures give some idea of the degree of
decentralization caused in the provision of this service.
In physical terms, the great advance in municipalization
was evident, even before the creation of FUNDEF. In
1997 the municipalities accounted for 40.7% of total
enrolment in the public school system, and this figure
rose by ten percentage points in the following five
years.
The most important form of evaluation therefore
refers to the increase in the number of children in
school: practically universal coverage has been
achieved in fundamental education. Between 1997 and
2001, the rate of enrolment of children between 7 and
14 years of age rose from 87.5% to 96.3%.20
FUNDEF has been analyzed in the most diverse
professional fields. Abreu (2003), for example,
discussed the possible options for financing the
expansion of basic education21 in the country and the
operational aspects of funds of this type, especially as
regards the coverage of expenditure that they should
accept. In principle, those who support the expansion
of fundamental education consider that, in order to
increase the budget available for its final activities,
FUNDEF should not cover expenditures in connection
with retired teachers or complementary actions such as
the distribution of school meals and books or the
transport of students. The fiscal managers of the
governments naturally hold the opposite position, since
the broader the list of expenditures accepted, the greater
their freedom of action in the fields of the budget and
financial execution.
Now that a good deal of experience has been
accumulated, the discussion is centered on another
challenge: the transformation of the transitory
constitutional rule on FUNDEF into a permanent rule. The
same thing happens with regard to the new challenges
that are arising and which may even be derived from
the earlier successes. In the case of fundamental
education, once a child is already going to school, the
next great objective is to improve the quality of the
education provided and —in so far as possible—
increase the number of hours of schooling, especially
in the poorest regions. In the case of secondary
education, it will be necessary to be able to meet a
sharp, rapid rise in demand, because of the larger
number of children completing their fundamental
education.22 In the case of pre-school education, what
is needed is to expand the current low level of
coverage, although it will be difficult to attain universal
coverage, because the cost per child is high and
exceeds that of the following levels.23
 The problem is how to finance the expansion of
the levels of education which are not covered by FUNDEF.
It is no use trying to repeat the successful system of
redistribution of that Fund, because pre-school education
is the responsibility of the municipalities, while the states
are responsible for secondary education. The tendency
is rather that the Union should be called upon to play a
more active role in financing the new areas of expansion
of education, which is what it finally did in a somewhat
19
 In regional terms, the effects of the redistribution of state income
to the municipalities were more marked in the less developed regions.
In the Northeast, because of FUNDEF the available income of the
state governments went down by almost 8%, while that of the
respective municipalities increased by nearly 15%. In the South and
Southeast, the variations were around 3% and 6%, respectively.
Taking isolated cases, the repercussions of decentralization were
greatest in the states of Ceará (a drop of 11% in the state
government’s income), Alagoas and Maranhão (-9%) and Rio de
Janeiro (-8%). The government of the state of São Paulo was the
least affected by the creation of FUNDEF: it lost only a little over 1%
of its available income through redistribution, while its municipalities
received an increase of around 3%.
20
 The federal government publishes detailed annual reports on the
financial and physical effects of FUNDEF. See the website of the
Ministry of Education: http://www.mec.gov.br/sef/fundef/
default.shtm.
21
 See footnote 4 for a definition of basic education and its
components (pre-school, fundamental and secondary).
22
 Between 1997 and 2001, total enrolment in secondary education
increased by 71%.
23
 During the period in question, total enrolment in pre-school
education increased by 20%.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 4  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 4
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT IN BRAZIL • JOSE ROBERTO RODRIGUES AFONSO
147
marginal way through FUNDEF. This is inevitable,
especially in secondary education, where it is most
urgent to increase the number of school places, since the
fiscal crisis of the states prevents most of them from
meeting these commitments.
2. The Single Health System (SUS): reforms
induced by the federal authorities
The 1988 Constitution provided for universal access
to public health through the introduction of a single
decentralized health system known as SUS. In order to
gain an idea of the social impact of this system, it may
be noted that currently 28.6% of the population of
Brazil uses exclusively the SUS, 61.5% complements it
with another system, and only a small minority of 8.7%
never use it at all.
The federal government has always played a
predominant role in its financing and also in the
provision of health services, both directly and through
a network of service agreements, once medical
assistance was linked to the social security system
itself. Health policies never clearly defined the function
of each sphere of government in all this. Thus, for
example, the big hospitals of Rio de Janeiro were
mostly federal, while those of São Paulo belonged to
the state government. Although there was a single
health system, it was marked by overlapping of
functions and a high level of centralization of financing
and management.
As from the mid-1990s, however, as the finances
of the Ministry of Health were strengthened, a firm
policy of decentralization of activities and services was
established, once again with the idea of delegating to
the municipalities the entire management of the system
in their respective territories. This was achieved in
almost 600 municipalities (in 16 states it continues to
be in the hands of the state government), while a
further 5,000 have already assumed responsibility for
running basic health attention services. The
management of the federal health units was gradually
transferred to the state sphere and —preferably— to
the municipalities. These levels of government
assumed responsibility for the contracting and payment
of services supplied to the ambulatory and hospital
system subject to service agreements, including non-
profit-making entities (such as the santas casas) and
private firms. The federal government was responsible
for ensuring their financing.
Once the federal budget of the Ministry of Health
had been reorganized and the financial flows to the
programmes in question had been placed on a regular
basis, the federal government supported a constitutional
amendment —proposed by the Labour Party, then in
the Opposition, and practically unanimously adopted
in 2000— which authorized the transfer of its own tax
revenue to the SUS, subject to a complementary Law
and compulsory five-yearly evaluations.24 This
amendment laid down, on a temporary basis, that
federal expenditure in this respect should be the same
as the year before, adjusted by the nominal variation
in GDP. In the case of the states and municipalities, a
timetable was set for the gradual allocation to the SUS,
as from 2004, of an increasing proportion of the
income from state and municipal taxes, until that
proportion reached 12% and 15%, respectively. There
is nothing to prevent a future complementary Law from
altering those percentages or changing the form of
allocation (for example, by requiring each government
to apply a per capita value from its own income).
We can thus see that this form of allocation is
different from that for education, firstly because the
calculation criteria do not figure in the permanent text
of the Constitution, and secondly because they do not
modify the apportionment criteria of the transfers. The
implementation of this initiative has given rise to
doubts and discussions, especially about its scope,
since the dividing line is very thin in the case of
sounder financial practices and assistance offered to
public employees. There are also discussions about the
basis used for both the federal allocation criteria and
the respective estimates of GDP.
The data provided by the Ministry of Health
(2003, p. 5) give us an idea of the enormous magnitude
of the SUS: ambulatory attention involves more than
63,000 units and nearly 153 million procedures per
year, while hospital attention covers more than 5,800
units, with 441,000 beds and nearly 11.7 million
admissions per year. Of these admissions, 2.6 million
correspond to births, 83,000 to cardiac surgery, and
60,000 to cancer surgery.
Once the process of regularization of traditional
health assistance had been completed, the federal
government began to establish and expand basic health
services. Once again, the subnational governments
were enlisted as partners and were made responsible
for the execution of most of the corresponding actions,
such as the hiring of doctors, nurses and auxiliary
personnel for the family health programmes and the
24
 Constitutional Amendment No. 29 of 13 September 2000.
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appointment of community health agents, and the
purchase of medicines, vaccines and other actions
forming part of the periodic per capita transfer of
responsibility for providing a minimum level of basic
health attention.
Thus, the active health policy included, among
other things, the expansion of the Family Health
Programme (PSF), free access to the main medicines,
expansion of the number and coverage of vaccinations,
expansion and improvement of the quality of prenatal
care (there was an increase of 89% in the number of
prenatal consultations between 1997 and 2001) and
high levels of investment in the rehabilitation and
technological modernization of the physical
infrastructure of the SUS. According to the impressive
data of the Ministry of Health (2003, p. 5), which show
the enormous scope of the system, 1 billion basic
medical attention procedures were carried out, 251
million laboratory tests were made, and 8.1 million
ultrasonic examinations were carried out. The
development of the SUS brought it to 90% of the cities
of Brazil, where by the end of 2002 55 million persons
had been attended and over 17,600 family medical
teams were in operation.
Unlike what happened in the case of education,
in the health sector federal financing still predominates
and there is no fund which unifies the allocation of
resources and still less carried out horizontal or vertical
redistributions, as FUNDEF does.25 Although there are
important intergovernmental financial relations, these
are in only one direction: from the federal government
to the subnational governments.
According to the Ministry of Health (2003, p. 9),
74% of its budget corresponds to transfers to lower
units. There are two main lines of transfer, and
although in the budget they figure as transfers between
levels of government, in practice they correspond rather
to income for services rendered, either directly or
through agreements. The first of these lines is
connected with the supply of services through the SUS
network of suppliers under agreements.
The second line concerns basic health attention
services. Part of these go through the subnational
accounts as a traditional transfer, especially in the case
of the municipalities. Since the transfers are on a
regular basis and the apportionment criteria are
predetermined according to technical definitions, these
movements are more similar to distributions of income
than to typically voluntary and irregular transfers
(furthermore, the Fiscal Responsibility Law excluded
transfers to the SUS by the latter sphere). Sometimes the
resources for primary assistance are paid directly by
the federal government to professionals and other
contract suppliers, although the management of the
services is the responsibility of the local authorities.
With the growing decentralization promoted by
the SUS, the transfers corresponding to this system have
taken on a fiscal dimension which is as important as
many of the sources of distribution of tax revenue. For
the subnational governments receiving these transfers,
the amount received from the SUS in 2002 was 7.9
billion reales: equivalent to 0.6% of GDP, nearly 4% of
the available tax income, and 15% of the total federal
taxes distributed.
The advance of municipalization is evident from
the fact that 79% of these resources were received by
local levels of government. The 6.3 billion reales
received from the SUS in the total income of the
municipalities is equivalent to 30% of their direct tax
revenue and 38% of the FPM. As these transfers are
closely linked to population distribution, two-thirds of
them were for the benefit of the municipalities of cities
with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Federal transfers
under the SUS are undoubtedly the most important,
constituting one of the largest sources of income of
municipalities with over 500,000 inhabitants: they
surpass those of the FPM by 74% and are equivalent to
19% of direct tax revenue and a little over 9% of
available tax income.
This health policy has had very positive results,
which may be summarized in the rapid and
considerable decline in infant mortality, from 38.4 per
thousand live births in 1994 to 28 per thousand in 2001.
This amounts to a 27% reduction in the national
average, notwithstanding the marked regional
disparities (in the Northeast, despite a relative reduction
which exceeded the national average, the figure was
still 44 per thousand in 2001).
 Periodically, reports are published on the
activities of the SUS; among them is the recent report
of the Ministry of Health (2003).26 Various specialists
and national and multilateral organizations have also
made appraisals. Thus, for example, Medici (2003)
25
 Oliveira (2003, p. 268-269) also highlights this difference between
the recent reforms of the SUS and FUNDEF.
26
 For a more detailed analysis, the Ministry provides an extensive
Virtual Library on its website http://dtr2001.saude.gov.brl/bvs/
biblioteca.htm.
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made a specific analysis of decentralization for the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and Biasoto
(2003) reviews the historical background with special
reference to intergovernmental relations.27
Although great progress has been made in recent
years, much remains to be done in order to expand the
supply and improve the quality of public health
services. Perhaps the main problem to be faced in the
management of the SUS is to increase the productivity
of the expenditure in this field.
At the macroeconomic level, we know that the
best policy for reducing future expenditure on medical
and hospital attention is to invest in more preventive
measures, especially through the formation of new
teams and the expansion of the coverage of family
health programmes and community agents. At the
microeconomic level, major improvements are needed
in the control and quality of expenditure, for example
through the long-overdue adoption of an electronic
identity card for users and the use of electronic means
in order to expedite purchases and reduce their cost.28
Such changes must take account of the following
factors: the magnitude of the task (suffice it to say that
the data processing department of the system, DATASUS,
handles one of the biggest data banks in the world);
the pressing need to maintain and further develop the
associations with the subnational governments, which
is of vital importance for applying solutions at the
macroeconomic and microeconomic levels, and, lastly,
the fact that the system of obligatory percentage
allocations of the subnational governments’ own tax
income is necessary in order to ensure a minimum
contribution of basic resources by the federal
government and in order to try to finance the expansion
of the system with increasingly large contributions by
the state and municipal governments.
3. Transfers of income: an incipient social safety
net
The above-mentioned changes in general educational
and health policies were followed by more dynamic
social policies, when, at the beginning of the present
decade, new assistance programmes were created
which are targeted on the poorest sectors of the
population. Some of these consist of programmes for
the payment —by cards— of financial subsidies for
children withdrawn from slave labour, in order to keep
them in school (the Child Labour Eradication
Programme-PETI); for the promotion of school
enrolment and assistance for schoolchildren (the Bolsa-
Escola scholarship programme); for the promotion of
breast feeding and proper infant nourishment (Bolsa-
Alimentação), and for compensation of the effects of
the withdrawal of household gas subsidies (Vale-Gás).
After the reforms promoted by the new federal
government, these programmes were placed under
unified management under the name of Bolsa-Família;
the criteria for eligibility and payment and the
counterpart requirements for beneficiaries continue
unchanged.
As a broader concept, the set of government
actions involving the payment of social benefits was
named Social Safety Net. These actions include other
older programmes, some of them calling for some kind
of contribution, such as those for unemployment
insurance, the payment of a wage bonus for poorly-paid
workers, and, most of all, the rural social security
programme (in the rural sector, the vast majority of
rural dwellers retired without attaining the actuarial
minimum number of contributions).29
27 The conclusions reached by Biasoto (2003, p. 49) are as follows:
“Health policy has been marked in recent years by three different
challenges. The first was the decentralization of health activities
and services proposed by various sectors of society as part of the
democratization process and carried forward by many managers
of the system. The second was the transition from the assurance
model to the universal access model, which also incorporated
various elements of a federative nature, apart from the aspect of
health assistance proper. The third was the great struggle. in the
area of social security and the government budget, to guarantee
federal resources for health and validate the allocation of resources
in the three spheres of government. None of these contributed to
the final design of the new institutions and policies. Nevertheless,
the accumulation of experience, the consolidation of rights and
the definition of fields of action created roots and fields of political
negotiation. It can be said that the efforts of the federal and state
authorities to recover their conditions for participation in the
process is proof of the success of decentralization, which
obviously has to reformulate new problems all the time”
(translated from the original Portuguese).
28
 For an updated analysis of the Brazilian experience and the
enormous potential for the control and reduction of costs through
electronic purchasing channels, see Fernandes (2004).
29
 In order to gain an idea of the magnitude of the social protection
provided by these programmes, it should be noted that in 2003 the
unemployment insurance programme benefited nearly 4.6 million
unemployed workers; the social assistance programmes (under the
Organic Social Assistance Law-LOAS) provided a minimum monthly
wage for 616,000 persons aged 70 or more or suffering from physical
incapacity and 1,684,000 disabled persons aged 67 or more (with a
total expenditure of 6.5 billion reales), and the rural social security
programme provided an income for almost 6,734,000 rural retired
persons (with a total expenditure of 20.1 billion reales), according
to the budget execution figures of the Ministry of Planning, Budget
and Management.
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The most prominent innovation, which even
attracted the attention of other countries, was that the
benefits were not distributed in the form of goods (such
as milk or food), but took the form of cash payments,
preferably to mothers; the beneficiaries use magnetic
cards to make withdrawals from bank cash machines
and buy their staple needs directly from established
local retailers as they see fit.30
The association with subnational governments has
played a crucial role in the application and follow-up
of these assistance programmes, because the local
authorities and officials, especially of the
municipalities, were vital for identifying, registering
and subsequently following up the progress of the
children and families assisted (table 8). Although the
resources do not pass through the municipal accounts,
they are nevertheless an important form of
intergovernmental relations, in so far as the
participation of the municipalities is of fundamental
importance for defining and identifying the
beneficiaries.31
30 According to the newspaper O Globo of 9 February 2004:
“A study made by the Coordinator of the Bolsa Família
programme shows that in cities with up to 75,000 inhabitants the
resources transferred are equivalent on average to 16% of the
FPM —in many cases the main source of income of the
municipalities—. With respect to FUNDEF, whose resources are to
be used only for education, the Bolsa-Família transfers are
equivalent to almost 30% ..... In São Francisco (Minas Gerais)
the amounts received by the programme represent 40% of the
sum received by the municipality from the federal government.
This is only 7.5% of the municipality’s income,. but it will have
direct consequences for the amount that the city will collect this
year. In Damião (Pernambuco) the difference is even greater.
This city is among the 10 cities where the arrival of the Bolsa-
Família programme had the greatest effect on local income. The
transfer to this programme now represents 20.1% of its
inhabitants’ income” (translated from the original Portuguese).
31
 In a summary evaluation of the implementation of this new
mechanism for intergovernmental relations and the provision of
social services, Almeida (2003, pp. 2-3) says:
“The agenda for the reform of the Brazilian social protection
system did not emerge rapidly. It was a political and social project
which involved debates, conflicts and an arduous learning process
for many actors: the governments of the three levels of the
federation, members of the opposition, and various organizations
of Brazilian society. Moreover, ..... it was gradually enriched with
new issues and new ways of looking at old issues, throughout
the 1990s ..... The reforms in social security, social assistance,
basic health attention, education, housing and actions to relieve
extreme poverty were its main aspects.
“The reform of the social protection system required changes in
the institutions, many of them achieved through changes in the
laws or, in many cases, the Constitution itself. This reform also
involved, in the cases of health, social assistance and education,
the transfer to the municipalities of powers and responsibilities of
the federal government —and, to a lesser extent, of the state
governments— and the construction of mechanisms for cooperation
among the three levels of government” (translated from the original
Portuguese).
In the poorest regions and localities of the country,
the benefits paid by the income transfer programmes
have come to play an increasingly large and important
role in the local economies, since a considerable part
of the local commerce has come to depend on the
consumption of the beneficiary pensioners and
families.
Although these programmes continued to operate
normally in the period immediately after the change of
administration in the federal government in 2003,
doubts soon began to arise. The year began with the
launch of Fome Zero (Zero Hunger), a new programme
to combat the causes of poverty. There was a great deal
of controversy, especially over the initial idea of
distributing food instead of giving financial assistance,
which was considered to be a backward step in terms
of social policy. Because of many operational
difficulties, the budget of the programme was
drastically reduced from 1.7 billion reales to 416
million between 2003 and 2004.
Later on, the idea of unifying assistance
programmes was put forward, but because of the
criticisms that this would entail the loss of various
control mechanisms (in such areas as vaccination or the
frequency of school attendance), the federal
government finally decided to unify only the records
of the different assistance programmes (a measure
which was already under way) under the title of Bolsa-
Família. Although associations with the subnational
governments had become more necessary than ever, by
the end of 2003 no state had volunteered to join in the
new federal programme.
Specialists in social programmes are increasingly
worried by the perception, which seems to be gaining
ground, that the new government authorities are more
concerned with changing or trying to change the
denomination or evaluation of programmes established
by previous governments than with perfecting and
expanding programmes that already existed and were
giving results. Intergovernmental relations are a
particularly decisive variable for the success of the
existing programmes.
Everything seems to indicate that, instead of
trying to reinvent the wheel in the field of social
policies, it would be better to correct the distortions,
increase the degree of association and improve control
mechanisms: in other words, to improve the existing
social programmes rather than trying to innovate —and
innovate on a large scale— in something that the poor
of Brazil need so much.
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TABLE 8
Brazil: Social actions carried out by the federal government in association
with other spheres of government, 2003
Source: Prepared by the Ministry of Justice/Secretariat for the Federal Budget/Office of Senador Lucía Vania/Integrated Financial Management
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The findings of an evaluation of the effects of
intergovernmental relations on macroeconomic
management and the provision of public services are
positive. In the first case, the Fiscal Responsibility Law
firmly established a process of cultural change and
emphasized the principle of autonomy within the
federation: after the adoption of that Law, each unit of
government became more responsible for its accounts
and affairs. With regard to the provision of services,
in the second half of the 1990s the federal government
recovered its capacity to formulate and execute
dynamic social policies and once again began to play
the main role in their formulation, coordination and
financing. In addition, wherever possible it delegated
programme execution to the subnational governments
or shared this responsibility with them, especially in
the fields of fundamental education, medical and
hospital attention (especially in respect of basic health
attention), and in new social assistance programmes.32
This does not mean that social problems are on the
point of being solved, nor that the associations between
levels of government with regard to social programmes
do not call for review and correction.33
The present results were achieved even though
intergovernmental relations in Brazil were not
explicitly designed for these purposes. They do not
provide for mechanisms for the apportionment and
evaluation of the constitutional distribution of tax
income (the main source of transfers) so as to make
the distribution of income among the subnational
governments not only ensures and rewards both the
generation of primary surpluses and the containment
of indebtedness within predetermined limits and also
the provision of public services.
Although the Brazilian federal system does not
permit direct specific intervention by the central
government in the activities of the subnational
governments, this has not prevented it from pursuing
the principles of social control through the adoption of
mechanisms for measuring the performance of the
states and municipalities in the most diverse areas.34
This is a field in which there is considerable room for
progress in the production and publication of
performance indicators with a reasonable degree of
sectoral detail, in order to stimulate comparisons
between the governments of similar regions and
economies, with similar budgets and institutional
frameworks, but always bearing in mind the profound
disparities between regions. It should be understood,
however, that such performance indexes will not serve32 For a brief analysis of comparative international experience,
especially in the cases of education, health and social assistance,
see de Mello (2003, pp. 24-25).
33
 In this connection, it is interesting to reproduce the conclusions
of Wiesner (2003, pp. 76 and 80) on the case of Brazil, in his
extensive recent analysis of fiscal decentralization in Latin America:
Wiesner considered that the most noteworthy feature of the Brazilian
case was the integral nature of its efforts and results in the following
four interdependent processes: i) fiscal decentralization at the state
and municipal levels; ii) market-oriented decentralization (such as
privatization and regulation); iii) sectoral decentralization (in
education and health, for example), and iv) its response to
macroeconomic constraints in a globalized environment. It was also
noteworthy, he considered, that Brazil together with Chile and to a
certain extent Mexico, was increasingly forming an integrated
institutional framework in order to provide a coherent normative
context for all these demanding interrelated processes. This really
was a great challenge. Finally, he said, Brazil was an example of
how difficult but nevertheless possible that task could be, since that
country had tackled an number of those problems and was now in
a leading position among the Latin American countries, thanks to
its correct approach. It was a country that was completely aware of
the need for “integral and coherent policies”.
34
 Souza (2004, p. 24) also arrives at a similar conclusion when he
analyzes the new trends in terms of governance in the local Brazilian
governments:
“In this study we have shown that the Brazilian experience in
terms of local governance has been marked by great institutional
innovation and a complex system of intergovernmental relations,
especially between the Union and the municipal governments.
These innovations arose initially from the commitments assumed
during the re-democratization process and subsequently from
decisions taken by the governments themselves, both federal and
local. Ultimately, in spite of the unequal capacity of the Brazilian
municipalities to form part of this new system of institutions,
there are some signs of change in the forms of local governance.
Despite the greater participation of local governments in the
provision of universal social services, however, it is not yet clear
whether these new institutions will be sustainable without the
financial support and leadership of the federal government”
(translated from the original Portuguese).
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for the calculation of the amounts to be transferred to
subnational governments in the future.
The aim is that greater transparency of fiscal
management should induce the local authorities to
improve their performance in their respective
communities.35 In this context, the role of the central
government should be aimed more at generating
information to promote the debate, which should be
taken to the forums with Constitutional powers to
redefine intergovernmental relations (i.e., the National
Congress).
Even if the central government has the power to
link the provision of services to the amounts of
resources distributed, its field of action is not as broad
when a technical evaluation (even a simple one) is
involved. Let us take the example of health. If, when
the effectiveness of the use made by municipalities of
the transfers for the provision of basic attention is
evaluated, it is concluded that the performance of a
particular municipality was worse than that of others
(for example, infant mortality increased, instead of
going down as it did in the rest of the region), this
raises various problems. Should the federal government
reduce or cut off future transfers? Could that locality,
with fewer resources for investing in health, reverse a
situation which had deteriorated even when its budget
in that area was higher? Who should be punished for
the poor performance evaluation? The municipal
authorities, or the families who would continue to lose
babies at birth? The same kind of doubts may arise
with respect to education, social assistance, or other
social areas.
Common sense indicates that, in the case of basic
social services —which involve the ongoing provision
of public services which are indispensable for the
population, and especially its poorest strata— the
punishment (or possibly reward) resulting from a
performance evaluation should not affect the financing
or expenditure on such activities, but other parts of the
local budget (for example, by permitting greater access
to credit for investments in infrastructure). Moreover,
social recognition of the performance of local
authorities is very important in a democratic regime in
which elections are held every four years to appoint
the Chief Executive and the legislatures of each state
and municipality.
Finally, there are grounds for criticizing the idea
which is beginning to spread among those responsible
for national macroeconomic strategy that the best way
to secure good fiscal performance and greater
efficiency and efficacy in the provision of services is
to eliminate the obligation to allocate certain
percentages of budgetary resources for particular types
of expenditure. This criticism is based essentially on
the fact that there is no relation of cause and effect: in
other words, neither establishing such allocations, nor
much less eliminating them, can ensure good or bad
performance in terms of expenditure.
It is not in the macroeconomic field that the most
pressing fiscal difficulties are to be observed;
consequently, it is not macroeconomic measures (such
as the elimination of such allocations) which will make
it possible to solve those difficulties. The biggest and
most undeniable problems with regard to expenditure
are connected with the management of activities and
projects. The roots of both the distortions and their
solutions are in what is called public sector
microeconomics.
A consensual way to a solution is through the
modernization of the public authorities. Some time ago,
the initiative of modernizing all the spheres of
government was taken up once again in Brazil, and
successful results were obtained, especially with regard
to electronic government (“e-gov”).36 In this latter field,
the advances made have been so numerous and
considerable that they have received important
international recognition from multilateral organizations,
universities, and even private consultants (Comité
Executivo do Goberno Eletrônico, 2003, pp. 42-43).37
For some time past we have been asserting that the next
step that should be taken after the Fiscal Responsibility
Law is to take measures to give greater continuity to
projects and actions to improve public management,
and above all to deepen their effects (Afonso, 2002).38
35
 The potential interest of the population in such indicators may be
seen from the amount of space devoted in the mass media to the
recently published human development indexes by states and
municipalities —and in some cases even by neighbourhoods— which
tend to arouse greater interest through the comparison of local
indicators with those for nearby federated units.
36
 For a first full analysis of the experience in e-government in
different fields, organs and spheres of government, see Fernandes
and Afonso (2001).
37
 Special mention may be made of the study by United Nations/
American Society for Public Administration (2002) which analyzes
the experience in electronic government in over a hundred countries,
with Brazil occupying the 18th position among the 36 most advanced
countries in this respect (“high e-gov capacity”).
38
 We realize that this perception has not yet been fully assimilated
by the new federal government, which, so far, has limited itself to
declaring its confidence in that Law (although when it was approved
by Congress in the year 2000 the Labour Party voted against it
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In order to modernize such management it is
necessary to train officials, secure the widespread
adoption of planning and strategic management
practices, invest heavily in informatics and take
advantage of every opportunity offered by advances in
that field, and promote those reforms in the legislature
and judiciary, as well as in the thousands of subnational
units of government. These measures have nothing to
do with the elimination of obligatory allocations of
resources, nor do they run counter to them. The
successful experience in the field of electronic
purchasing, which is still only used to a limited extent,
should be rapidly extended to all the federal organs,
the other State powers, and also the subnational
governments. There is an enormous field for
exploration as regards integrated tenders.
Since the last change of leadership in the federal
government, it is frequently said that little has changed
in the field of macroeconomic policy, but the same
cannot be said of the microeconomic management of
the State, in view of the lack of continuity in a series
of initiatives39 and the undeniable existence of flagrant
problems in respect of social policies, with increasingly
obvious setbacks.40
Fortunately, this disorder is conjunctural rather
than structural, so that if the government recovers the
political will to give priority and effectively implement
the plans for the modernization of management
practices it will be possible to start acting again soon
and obtain results, especially because the new
information and communication technologies
increasingly offer more and better opportunities.41
The general conclusion is that the Brazilian
federation needs to be improved, but not reconstructed.
(Original: Portuguese)
unanimously and subsequently tried to have it annulled by the
Federal Supreme Court). Moreover, the new government confuses
structural reform with conjunctural measures, claiming that the best
proof of its new commitment to fiscal responsibility is that it raised
the primary surplus target —although the IMF did not ask it to do
so— and exceeded that historical goal throughout 2003, with the
Ministry of Finance preening itself on promoting cuts in expenditure
for the first time.
39
 For example, there are operational difficulties in expanding and
renewing the lines of finance for modernizing the fiscal management
of the subnational governments. This is so in the case of the resources
transferred by the IDB —as in the case of the establishment of a new
stage of the National Programme of Support for the Fiscal
Administration of the Brazilian States (PNAFE), or the implementation
of its municipal version (PNAFEM) or even the contracting of other
programmes for the Accounts Tribunals and the state planning and
administration systems— or those established with their own
resources by local banks (reducing the spread of the Municipal Tax
Administration Modernization Programme —PMAT— of the National
Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES).
40
 One symptom of these problems is the 80% reduction in the
amount allocated for the child labour eradication programme in 2004,
decided upon by the present federal government in its first budget,
so that the allocation of only 100 million reales thus decreed will
only permit coverage of some 200,000 children, compared with the
841,000 covered in 2003 and the target (established by that
government itself) of eventually reaching 1.5 million children.
41
 The federal government already announced an ambitious
management plan whose success would appear to be of more
decisive importance for tackling the above-mentioned problems than
more thorough-going changes in the institutional structure of the
federation and finances (see Secretaría de Gestión, 2003).
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